# NC

## Theory Pre-empts

Neg gets RVIs if I don’t run theory.

Key to reciprocity. Also key to deter the 1AR from using blippy theory to minimize engagement.

Competing interps causes a race to the bottom where every round comes down to marginally different theory interps, so if there isn’t decisive in round abuse, disregard offensive theory shells.

## CP

Text: Amazon Countries should recognize a private property right in forest resources.

Private property rights are key to sustainable forest management.

**Namaalwa 8** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**An important reason for** the **massive degradation of** natural **resources in developing countries is** a **lack of** well-defined and **secure property rights** (Ostrom, 1999; Panayotou, 1993; Pearce and Warford, 1993). In a discussion of deforestation, Wardell et al.(2003:10) concluded that **property rights should be developed to reduce open access to forest land** and to establish competitive markets; “National governments and official development aid institutions should increase efforts to overcome transaction costs and implement closing of open access to forests, particularly through land reform and decentralization projects”. According to the property rights school, **privatization** of natural resources among potential users **will lead to efficient use and allocation through market forces** as it provides resource owners with incentives to undertake required investments to improve resource conditions (Demsetz, 1967). Hardin (1968) further argued that privatisation of renewable natural resources is the only feasible way to assure sustainable exploitation rates. This follows from the fact that private property combines both exclusivity and transferability (Randall, 1975). **One owner depending on the revenue** from such ownership **would** under most circumstances **see to it that the resource is not depleted**. For example, **private ownership has been a successful forest management regime in many** core **capitalist countries** (Beach et al., 2005; Karppinen, 1998).

Sweden proves

**Pennington 5** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

In this framework, free-market environmentalism has made a strong case for much greater use of private-property rights and “imperfect” market processes as an alternative to the regulatory state. Authors such as Terry Anderson and Donald Leal (2001) have documented numerous examples of environmental goods that can be and are supplied successfully in private markets, and empirical researchers examining state-centered models of environmental management have highlighted numerous cases of government failure. **For** land-based environmental assets such as **forests and minerals,** for example, **evidence suggests that private-property solutions are highly successful in generating** the necessary **incentives that encourage resource conservation and help** to **overcome** the problems of **“free riding”** associated with open-access conditions (De Alessi 2003). Thus, the record of **forest management in Sweden under a predominantly private regime has been noticeably more impressive than** the record of **forest management under government ownership in the U**nited **S**tates, Canada, and Great Britain. Similarly, the private ownership of wildlife in countries such as Botswana has had markedly more success in protecting stocks than government-sponsored trade bans on ivory products that have been put in place over much of Africa (Sugg and Kreuter 1994).

Environmental regulation kills growth which turns the environment.

**Adler 1** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

[Brackets in original.] **Economic progress is** absolutely **essential to environmental progress**. Environmental protection is a good, and like all goods it must be purchased. A healthy economy is necessary to finance environmental improvements. While many environmental activists perceive a conflict between economic growth and environmental progress, the opposite is true. Sewage treatment facilities and other environmental **improvements are not free**. Moreover, **a significant body of literature has found** a **correlation between economic improvements and** several measures of **environmental quality**. Not only are wealthy communities healthier than poor communities, but they also tend on average to be more concerned about upholding environmental values as well. Wealthier societies have both the means and the desire to address a wider array of environmental concerns. Economic **growth fuels tech**nological advance and generates the resources necessary **to** deploy new methods of **meet**ing **human needs efficiently** and effectively**. Thus, wealthier societies** tend to **provide for human needs in a more environmentally sound manner**. “Countries undergo an environmental transition as they become wealthier and reach a point at which they start getting cleaner.” This occurs first with particularly acute environmental concerns, such as access to safe drinking water and sanitation services. As affluence increases, so does the attention paid to conventional pollution concerns such as fecal coliform bacteria and urban air quality. In much the same way that wealthier societies become cleaner, “wealthier is healthier.” In other words, **as income increases, mortality and morbidity decline**. Conversely, “when national income falls, there is often a significant increase in mortality and a decline in health status. Expenditures on regulatory compliance are rarely wealth enhancing, and therefore increasing regulatory costs can reduce gains in public health. As Justice Stephen Breyer observed, “[a]t all times regulation imposes costs that mean less real income available to individuals for alternative expenditure[, which] itself has adverse health effects. Wealthier societies are not only cleaner and healthier; they are also more willing and able to devote resources to environmental concerns. Public support for environmental measures, both public and private, correlates with changes in personal income. In economic jargon, “[w]illingness to pay for environmental measures…is highly elastic with respect to income.” Thus, it should be no surprise that **donors to environmental groups tend to have above average** annual **incomes.** Members of the Sierra Club, for example, have an average household income more than double the US average. In the aggregate, **environmental regulation** can work against continuing environmental progress by diverting tens of billions of dollars, if not more, away from wealth-creating activity. Insofar as regulation **reduces** economic **growth by diverting investment and** human **energies** away **from productivity, it will retard environmental progress**. While **this** is true in the US, it **is especially true in the poorest** of **nations**. Therefore, environmental policy makers must always be conscious of the costs of environmental measures, as increased compliance costs can come at the expense of environmental improvement.

Solving growth is a prereq to aff solvency. **EcoVitality 99** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Neither environmental law nor** environmental **education has been able to counter** the overwhelming **priority placed on** economic **development in virtually all poor countries.  Neither environmental law nor** environmental **education can succeed when people lack viable economic alternatives---poor people will not let their families starve to save trees or tigers**, no matter how much they appreciate nature--**and most people in developing nations want more than minimal subsistence**.  Environmental law and education rely mainly on the impact of words, words that are often no more than idealized exhortations, but conservation-oriented words have seldom been compelling enough to produce meaningful conservation actions in the developing countries.

Private property rights are key to democracy which is a prerequisite to solving the aff.

**Anderson and Huggins 3** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

Improvement of the environment with income growth is not automatic but depends on policies and institutions. Economic growth creates the conditions for environmental improvement by raising the demand for improved environmental quality and makes the resources available for supplying it. Whether environmental quality improvements materialize or not, when, and how, depend critically on government policies, social institutions, and the completeness and functioning of markets. **Institutions that promote democratic governments are a prerequisite for** sustainable development and enhanced **environmental quality. Where democracy dwells, constituencies for environmental protection can** afford to **exist-without** people **fearing arrest or prosecution**. The democratization of thirty-plus countries in the last twenty-five years has dramatically improved the prospects for environmental protection (Desta 1999). In the other direction, **dictatorships and warlords burden people and environments** in many regions of the world such as China and much of Africa. Zimbabwean president Robert **Mugabe**, for example, has clearly **indicated** that he has **no intention of respecting property rights** or the rule of law. His "terror teens" have brutally killed innocent people, and **his "land reform"** plan **demands that** more than **20 million** of the 23.5 million **acres** under private ownership **be surrendered without compensation. Mugabe's assault on private property has** also **taken a toll on wildlife, for without landowners, there is no one to protect them from poachers.** Before Mugabe's attack on private property, Zimbabwe had previously shown the world how to balance economic development with conservation through private and communal ownership. The CAMPFIRE program, for example, championed by the World Wide Fund for Nature, allowed local communities to manage wildlife. Hence wildlife became an asset as villagers in communal areas profited from hunting and photo safaris. Elephant populations mushroomed and poaching plummeted. But Mugabe has duped the poor people of Zimbabwe into thinking that land redistribution without compensation or due process is the key to economic prosperity. In fact, **sustainable development will come only from stable property rights**. Unless the sanctity of private property can be reestablished in Zimbabwe, its people and its wildlife will continue to suffer. Environmental degradation does not stem from the actions of the first world but rather from jumbled bureaucratic systems-often the result of well-meaning but misguided intervention. In particular, lack of well-defined and adequately enforceable property rights restricts economic development and stifles entrepreneurial activity in many countries. The Peruvian economist Hernando **de Soto** (2000) estimates that people in the third world and in ex-communist countries hold more than $9 trillion in what he calls "dead capital"-property that is owned informally, but not legally, and is thus incapable of forming the basis of robust economic development. He **advocates** the **formal recognition of property rights** in these countries **as an indispensable prerequisite for liberal democracy.**

## Case

### Link Defense

REDD Fails; vague guidelines and high costs

**The Economist 9**

(Seeing REDD IN The Amazon. June 11, 2009. The Economist)

So **the second idea for saving forests lies in changing economic incentives by paying people not to chop down trees—an idea known** in the ghastly jargon of climate-change diplomacy **as** “reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation” **(REDD).** Since many rich countries felled their forests as they developed it seems fair that they should pay some of the cost of this. **There are difficulties, though. One is that “avoided deforestation” is hard to define and quantify. Another**, raised by officials in Europe who have chosen not to include REDD in the European carbon-trading scheme, **is that the carbon market would be flooded with deforestation credits that will push down the price.** **Companies would then buy cheap credits and continue doing business as usual rather than cutting their own emissions.** Further tricky issues abound: who should have the right to sell credits? How should the money be split between central governments, local governments and indigenous people? And should the money be paid in perpetuity? **REDD schemes will require careful monitoring to ensure that forests really are left intact and that carbon credits for an area are not claimed more than once. Murky goings-on in Papua New Guinea, one of the leading advocates of REDD, highlight such worries (see article).**

### Biodiversity Defense

Bio-D isn’t key to the environment – studies prove

**WashPost 97** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

Ecologists have long maintained that diversity is one of nature's greatest strengths, but new research suggests that diversity alone does not guarantee strong ecosystems. In findings that could intensify the debate over endangered species and habitat conservation, three **new studies suggest** a greater abundance of plant and animal **varieties do**es**n't always translate to better ecological health**. At least equally important, the research found, are the types of species and how they function together. "Having a long list of Latin names isn't always better than a shorter list of Latin names," said Stanford University biologist Peter Vitousek, co-author of one of the studies published in the journal Science. **Separate experiments** in California, Minnesota and Sweden, **found that diversity** often **had little bearing** on the performance of ecosystems -- at least as measured by the growth and health of native plants. In fact, the communities with the greatest biological richness were often the poorest when it came to productivity and the cycling of nutrients. One study compared plant life on 50 remote islands in northern Sweden that are prone to frequent wildfires from lightning strikes. Scientist David Wardle of Landcare Research in Lincoln, New Zealand, and colleagues at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, found that islands dominated by a few species of plants recovered more quickly than nearby islands with greater biological diversity. Similar findings were reported by University of Minnesota researchers who studied savannah grasses, and by Stanford's Vitousek and colleague David Hooper, who concluded that functional characteristics of plant species were more important than the number of varieties in determining how ecosystems performed. British plant **ecologist** J.P. **Grime**, in a commentary summarizing the research, **said there is** as yet **no "convincing evidence that** species **diversity and ecosystem function are** consistently and causally **related**." "It could be argued," he added, "that the tide is turning against the notion of high biodiversity as a controller of ecosystem function and insurance against ecological collapse."

Prefer my evidence. His impacts are media hype.

**Spencer 8** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

The **media can always find an expert** who is **willing to provide** some **juicy quotes regarding** our imminent **environmental doom**. Usually there is a grain of truth to the story which helps sell the idea. Like a science fiction novel, a somewhat plausible weather disaster tale captures our imagination, and we consider the possibility of global catastrophe. And some of the catastrophic events that are predicted are indeed possible, or at least not impossible. Catastrophic global warming—say by 10° Fahrenheit or more over the next century—cannot be ruled out with 100 percent certainty. Of course, neither can the next extraterrestrial invasion of Earth. But theoretical possibilities reported by the media are far from competent scientific predictions of the future. The bias contained in all of these gloom-and-doom news stories has a huge influence on how we perceive the health of the Earth and our effect on it. We scientists routinely encounter reporters who ignore the uncertainties we voice about global warming when they write their articles and news reports. Sometimes an article will be fairly balanced, but that is the exception. **Few reporters** are willing to **push a story** on their editor **that says** that future global **warming could be fairly benign. They are** much more **interested in gloom and doom. A scientist can** spend twenty minutes **describ**ing **new** and important **research, but if it can’t be expressed in simple, alarmist language, you can** usually **forget about** a reporter using **it**. It has reached the point where the minimum amount of necessary alarm amounts to something like, “we have only ten years left to avert catastrophic global warming.” A reporter will probably run with that. After all, which story will most likely find its way into a news-paper: “Warming to Wipe out Half of Humanity,” or “Scientists Predict Little Warming”? It goes without saying that, **in science, if you want to keep getting funded, you should find something Earth-shaking**. And if you want to get your name in the newspaper, give a reporter some material that gives him hope of breaking the big story.

### Disease Defense

No disease impact. Empirics and evolution

**Posner 5** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

Yet the fact that **Homo sapiens** has **managed to survive every disease** to assail it **in** the **200,000 years** or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the **Black Death, smallpox**, and now **AIDS**, but **none has come close** to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. **Natural selection favors** germs of **limited lethality**; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense **because** their **genes** are more likely to be **spread if the germs do not kill** their hosts **too quickly**. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The **likelihood o**f a natural pandemic that would cause the **extinction** of the human race **is** probably **even less** today **than** in **the past** (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease.

### Corruption Turn

REDD’s Funding Mechanism Kills Solvency And Ensures Corruption And Fraud

**Barbler 11**

(Spotlight: A REDD And Green Paradox. December 5, 2011. Edward B. Barbler, Professor of Economics At The University Of Wyoming.)

In addition, **REDD+ is likely to rely on two sources of funding: through carbon market offsets**, where polluters in rich countries purchase carbon credits from local communities and developing nations that maintain their forests, **or through bilateral deals, s**uch as the Norwegian government’s International Forests and Climate Initiative. The talks at Durban have not changed this funding dynamic for REDD+, nor will any subsequent climate change negotiations in the near future. **However, both approaches have been criticized. First, carbon trading is treated with suspicion, as it seen as a way for rich country polluters to shift the full costs of their carbon emissions to developing countries. Second, bilateral REDD+ deals, such as those instigated by Norway, are criticized for transferring large sums of money to developing countries that simply perpetuate corruption, fraud and poor governance.**

Corruption Directly Increases Environmental Degradation which turns the case.

**Dillon et al., 2006:**

(Corruption & The Environment, A Project For Transparency International. April 2006. Jessica Dillon, Consultant With Transparency International)

Environmental corruption is especially prevalent where economic development is low. Although corruption is widespread, it tends to be especially prevalent in poorer countries. **Corruption** is not an inevitable consequence for impoverished countries, but rather **is itself a** contributing **limitation to development**. Corruption and poor environmental performance are common in lesser developed countries, but they are not unavoidable characteristics of underdevelopment, as demonstrated by Chile, which has less bribery than many fully industrialized countries (although corruption remains a problem: see Box 5.1).170 **Corruption has direct** economic **costs, such as the diversion of public resources** to private individuals, **as well as longer-term consequences such as reduced** foreign **investment a**nd reduced legitimacy of the state, **which,** in turn, **drives economic activity underground.**171 At the same time, the **empirical evidence suggests a strong relationship between** economic **development and environmental performance**. The Environmental Performance Index demonstrates that environmental performance tends to be stronger in countries with higher levels of GDP per capita**.** **The link between corruption and poverty** on the one hand **and poverty and environmental performance** on the other hand **suggests an avenue through which impoverished countries and corruption act collaboratively with the result of an increased likelihood of environmental degradation.**

Corruption in developing countries causes crime and poverty. **Gascoigne 13** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

WASHINGTON, DC – **Crime, corruption, and tax evasion drained** US$**946**.7 **billion from the developing world in 2011**, up more than 13.7 percent from 2010—when illicit financial outflows totaled US$832.4 billion. The findings—which peg cumulative illicit financial outflows from developing countries at US$5.9 trillion between 2002 and 2011—are part of a new study published today by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a Washington, DC-based research and advocacy organization. The report, “Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2011,” [ PDF | HTML ] is GFI’s 2013 annual update on the amount of money flowing out of developing economies as a result of crime, corruption and tax evasion, and it is the first of GFI’s reports to include data for the year 2011. “As the world economy sputters along in the wake of the global financial crisis, **the illicit underworld is thriving—siphoning more and more money** from developing countries **each year**,” said GFI President Raymond Baker. “Anonymous shell companies, tax haven secrecy, and trade-based money laundering techniques drained nearly a trillion dollars from the world’s poorest in 2011, **at a time when rich and poor nations** alike **are struggling to spur** economic **growth**. While global momentum has been building over the past year to curtail this problem, more must be done. This study should serve as a wake-up call to world leaders: **the time to act is now**.” Methodology Authored by GFI Chief Economist Dev **Kar and** GFI Junior Economist Brian **LeBlanc**, the study is the first by GFI to incorporate trade data on re-exports from Hong Kong and the first to integrate bilateral trade data for those countries which report it—making this report the most accurate analysis of illicit financial outflows produced by GFI to date. “We’re constantly striving to improve the accuracy of our estimates,” said Dr. Kar, the principal author of the study. “We determined that by omitting data from the use of Hong Kong as a trade intermediary, the previous methodology—which was accepted by most economists studying trade misinvoicing—had the potential to overstate illicit outflows from many Asian countries. At the same time, it became clear that by utilizing aggregated—instead of disaggregated—bilateral trade data, the previous methodology had the potential to understate illicit financial outflows from other countries. By adjusting for these two problems, we can confidently say that these are the most authoritative estimates of illicit financial outflows produced to date.” “The estimates provided by our new methodology are still likely to be extremely conservative as they do not include trade misinvoicing in services, same-invoice trade misinvoicing, hawala transactions, and dealings conducted in bulk cash,” explained Dr. Kar, who served as a Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund before joining GFI in January 2008. “This means that much of the proceeds of drug trafficking, human smuggling, and other criminal activities, which are often settled in cash, are not included in these estimates.” Findings The US$946.7 billion of illicit outflows lost in 2011 is a 13.7 percent uptick from 2010—which saw developing countries hemorrhage US$832.4 billion—and a dramatic increase from 2002, when illicit outflows totaled just US$270.3 billion. The study **estimate**s **the developing world lost** a total of US$**5**.9 **trillion over the decade spanning** 20**02 through 2011**. “It’s extremely troubling to note just how fast illicit flows are growing,” stated Dr. Kar. “Over the past decade, illicit outflows from developing countries increased by 10.2 percent each year in real terms—significantly outpacing GDP growth. This underscores the urgency with which policymakers should address illicit financial flows.” Moreover, the US$946.7 billion that flowed illicitly out of developing countries in 2011 was approximately 10 times the US$93.8 billion [XLS | 49 KB] of net official development assistance (ODA) that went into these specific 150 developing countries that year. This means that for every US$1 in economic development assistance going into a developing country, roughly US$10 of capital are lost via illicit outflows. “Illicit financial flows have major consequences for developing economies,” explained Mr. LeBlanc, the co-author of the report. “**Poor countries hemorrhaged nearly a trillion** dollars from their economies in 2011 **that could have been invested in local businesses, healthcare, education, or infrastructure. This** is nearly a **trillion** dollars that **could have been used to help pull people out of poverty and save lives**. Without concrete action, the drain on the developing world is only going to grow larger.”

### General Turns

REDD Exponentially Increase Deforestation; Leakage

**Grainger et al., 2009:**

(Biodiversity and REDD AT Copenhagen. Current Biology, Vol. 19, Issue 21. November 17, 2009. Alain Grainger, Senior Lecturer In Global Change & Policy At The University Of Leeds, Et al.)

**Another concern is ‘leakage’, whereby deforestation processes are not effectively abated by REDD but simply displaced to other areas. Site-specific conservation projects could save forests locally, but displace deforestation elsewhere. For instance, the establishment of forest reserves in the Peruvian Amazon contributed to forest degradation and clearing increasing in adjacent areas by 300–470%** [[17]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.gsu.edu/science/article/pii/S096098220901776X#bib17). **REDD policies are intended to minimize leakage** by requiring emissions from deforestation to be reduced against national or large regional baselines, **but risks remain. Recent modeling suggests that up to 95% of reductions in one country may be leaked as increased degradation in others** [[18]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.gsu.edu/science/article/pii/S096098220901776X#bib18). **So implementing REDD might accelerate the conversion and degradation of high-biodiversity areas where REDD or other conservation funding is not available** [**[1]**](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.gsu.edu/science/article/pii/S096098220901776X#bib1)**.**

REDD Forces Countries To Backslide On Environmental Legislation

**Grainger et al., 2009:**

(Biodiversity and REDD AT Copenhagen. Current Biology, Vol. 19, Issue 21. November 17, 2009. Alain Grainger, Senior Lecturer In Global Change & Policy At The University Of Leeds, Et al.)

Finally, **REDD might cause some nations to backslide on their environmental legislation, thinking that they might become eligible for more REDD funds at some point in the future. Central to UNFCCC rules is the concept of ‘additionality’ — credit can only be given for new actions, not ones already taken. Indonesia, for instance, recently removed its legislation prohibiting clearing of peat-swamp forests, and some suspect that the prospect of future REDD funding played a part in this** [**[19]**](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.gsu.edu/science/article/pii/S096098220901776X#bib19)**.**

REDD Allows Massive Deforestation To Continue

**F.O.E.I., 2008:**

(REDD myths a critical review of proposed mechanisms to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries december 2008 | issue 114. Friends Of The Earth International, is the world’s largest grassroots environmental network,

uniting more than 70 diverse national member groups and some 5,000 local activist groups on

every continent.)

First and foremost, **REDD is about reducing deforestation, not stopping it.** From a climate change point of view, the goal is to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of CO2 at as low a level as possible. This can partly be achieved by reducing deforestation, which is a significant source of carbon emissions to the atmosphere. **However, some countries, such as Brazil, are talking about reducing ‘net’ deforestation rates. This approach would enable countries to allow logging and agricultural expansion into the forest to continue in some areas, whilst conserving forests and/or extending plantations in others**. Zero ‘net’ deforestation is not the same as stopping deforestation. It is also argued that the cumulative atmospheric concentration of CO2 can be reduced by deferring deforestation: even if deforestation rates return to their original level after a certain period, cumulative concentrations of greenhouse gaseswill still be less than they would have been (Ebeling, 2007). There now seems to be increasing governmental consensus around what is known as the ‘50-50-50’ option which involves: *“reducing deforestation rates 50% by 2050 and then maintaining them at this level until 2100 [which] would avoid the direct release of up to 50GtC [gigatonnes of carbon] this century (equivalent to nearly 6 years of recent annual fossil fuel emissions)”* (Gullison et al, 2007). **This rather undermines another argument used to promote REDD: that it will be good for biodiversity (see below). In current REDD scenarios it is perfectly plausible that deforestation could be allowed to continue at unacceptable rates, with prolonged damage to biodiversity and the risk that forests will be tipped into a process of dieback (FOEI, 2008).**

REDD’s Focus On Carbon Credits Proactively Undermines Efforts To Check Fossil Fuel Consumption, Which Is The Root Cause Of Their Impacts

**F.O.E.I., 2008:**

(REDD myths a critical review of proposed mechanisms to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries december 2008 | issue 114. Friends Of The Earth International, is the world’s largest grassroots environmental network,

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**A further major concern is that REDD could actually negate existing efforts to mitigate climate change if it is funded by the sale of forest carbon credits** on the international compliance markets. **If REDD is funded through carbon offsetting it will undermine current and future emissions reductions agreed to by industrialized countries. Allowing countries with carbon intensive lifestyles to continue consuming inequitably and unsustainably, by permitting them to fund cheaper forest carbon ‘offsets’ in developing countries, diverts critical resources and attention away from measures to address fossil fuel consumption and the real underlying causes of deforestation.**

### Indigenous Peoples

REDD Programs Result In The Violent Displacement Of Indigenous Peoples While Promoting Gender Discrimination

**F.O.E.I., 2008:**

(REDD myths a critical review of proposed mechanisms to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation in developing countries december 2008 | issue 114. Friends Of The Earth International, is the world’s largest grassroots environmental network,

uniting more than 70 diverse national member groups and some 5,000 local activist groups on

every continent.)

Whether national or project-based, **REDD could trigger a rapid expansion in lands set aside for REDD projects, without regard for the customary and territorial rights of Indigenous Peoples, as governments seek to protect an increasingly valuable resource from ‘outside’ interference, violently or otherwise**. Some **1.6 billion people rely on forests, including 60 million Indigenous people**, who are entirely dependent upon forests for their livelihoods, food, medicines and/or building materials (FAO, 2008). These people have already been severely impacted both by the loss of forests, cleared largely to grow crops and agrofuels for export, and by CDM reforestation and afforestation projects. **Often having no formal land title, many people have already been forcibly and even violently ejected fromtheir ancestral territories. If the financial value of standing forests goes up they are increasingly likely to face governments and companies willing to go to extreme lengths to wrest their forests from them. Commodifying forest carbon is also inherently inequitable, since it discriminates against people, and especially women, who previously had free access to the forest resources they need to raise and care for their families, but cannot afford to buy forest products or alternatives** (GFC, 2008).

## 2NR

### Perm Answers

Normal means for sustainable development is top-down regulation.

**Anderson and Huggins 3** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

The focus on center stage should be on promoting institutions that empower people both politically and economically. These institutions allow people to improve environmental quality indefinitely into the future. This stands in sharp contrast to the undying conclusion of the doomsayers for whom the environment and the plight of human beings will always be worse. Doomsayers continue to profess, as they have since Thomas Malthus, that exponential economic growth and consumption will ultimately run up against resource limits. Paul and Ann Ehrlich (1996, 11) are perhaps the gloomiest. Humanity is now facing a sort of slow-motion environmental Dunkirk. It remains to be seen whether civilization can avoid the perilous trap it has set for itself. Unlike the troops crowding the beach at Dunkirk, civilization's fate is in its own hands; no miraculous last-minute rescue is in the cards. . . . even if humanity manages to extricate itself, it is likely that environmental events will be defining ones for our grandchildren's generation-and those events could dwarf World War II in magnitude. Those with this mind-set often call for more government regulation to stop growth and curb consumption. For example, Klaus Töpfer (2002, 1), the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), hopes to create a "model for international environmental governance." **Implicit in** the definition and use of **the term sustainable development is** the acceptance that market systems fail to promote sustainability and therefore **that command-and-control regulations are necessary** to achieve the goal of sustainable development. Agenda 21, for instance, adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in **Rio** de Janeiro **calls on governments to "create national** strategies, plans, and **policies"** for sustainable development. **The solution offered by those who follow this interpretation is** to impose **top-down** measures such as **restrictions on** the **use of resources**, interventions in the behavior of multinational companies, and restrictions on international trade. Yet evidence suggests the contrary.

Doing both leads to flawed environmental policies. The free market alone can solve the aff.

**Adler 2k** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Some environmentalists also see the strategic political benefit of market rhetoric and some free market policies. Ned Ford, energy chair of the Sierra Club’s Ohio chapter, argues that “by forcing the marketplace to the lowest cost solution that really works, environmentalists gain credibility and enhance the opportunity for further reduction.”24 Even President Bill Clinton has acknowledged the importance of developing a “market-based environmental-protection strategy,” noting that “Adam Smith’s invisible hand can have a green thumb.”25 Too often, however, market rhetoric merely merchandises government regulatory policies. **Environmentalist groups rarely adopt FME policies fully, opting instead to pick and choose free market precepts**. Attempts to use “market mechanisms” to reach predetermined environmental outcomes are the most common example of this tactic. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), for instance, advocates widespread use of “pollution credit trading” as a market-oriented policy. Setting an emission level as an environmental target, the EDF proposal allows companies the freedom to determine how best to reach it. Companies could buy and sell emission allotments among themselves to find the least-cost means to reach a goal set by government regulation. Explains EDF’s Dan Dudek, “Who is better to know [what to do] than the people who own and operate” the facility causing pollution?26 FME advocates note that **this approach will not necessarily produce sound environmental policy. The Clean Air Act Amendments** of 1990, for instance, **include** an elaborate EDF-designed **pollution-credit trading** scheme **for sulfur oxide** emissions to control acid rain. **Many companies favored the policy because**, by allowing them to select the least-cost pollution reduction measures, **they might save millions** of dollars **in compliance costs. But** was a sulfur oxide emission reduction plan needed at all? **The most extensive US study of acid rain** to date **suggests that acid rain was not a substantial threat to forests and streams**, despite environmentalist claims to the contrary. John Baden warns against market mechanisms that are used “simply as tools for the efficient delivery of environmental goals…[while] the goals themselves remain collectively determined.”27 CEI’s Fred **Smith calls such policies “market socialism**,**” as they resemble** the **efforts in Communist countries to use market mechanisms to reach politically determined production quotas**. EDF’s emission trading scheme is structurally the equivalent of the tradeable wheat production quotas established in parts of Eastern Europe. Notes Smith, “the efficiency gains of market systems occur not only in production, but in allocation as well. This means that **markets are as effective at determining what is to be done as** they are at determining **how it should be accomplished.”**

Calling for government intervention whenever the free market fails is ineffective.

**Adler 2k** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

The fundamental problem with existing environmental laws is that they embody a command-and-control, government-knows-best mentality. Conventional policy approaches proceed from the assumption that markets “fail” to address environmental concerns. **Government intervention is called for wherever market activities impact environmental quality. Yet there is no end to** the range of **private activities which generate environmental effects,** **and centralized** regulatory **agencies are ill-equipped to handle myriad ecological interactions triggered** or impacted **by private activity**. As environmental analyst Richard Stewart noted, “**the system has grown to the point where it amounts to** nothing less than a massive effort at **Soviet-style planning** of the economy to achieve environmental goals.”1 Stewart’s description is particularly apt. **The Soviet economic model, like the conventional approach to environmental protection,** was able to produce gains for a time. Collectivized agriculture did produce wheat—at least in the beginning. Over time, however, centrally-planned systems **collapsed under their own weight, revealing a bankrupt core**. As with the economic planning of the former Soviet nations, so too with the ecological planning of the federal regulatory state. There is a growing consensus that **federal regulatory policies are too costly and ineffective**. Regulations passed in the 1960s and 1970s are no longer generating satisfactory results. In many cases, **well-intentioned regulatory systems are** even **making environmental problems worse**. Dissatisfied with the status quo approach to environmental policy, a growing number of scholars and policy analysts are turning to the marketplace to address environmental concerns. They have found in what many call “free market environmentalism” a new set of policy approaches that reconcile human needs and environmental concerns. Grounded in property rights, voluntary exchange, common law liability protections, and the rule of law, free market environmentalism seeks to integrate environmental resources into the market system. Rather than regulate each new potential risk to environmental quality, free market environmentalists advocate the creation of institutional arrangements that facilitate private solutions to environmental concerns. **Markets are not perfect, but they are superior to the regulatory alternative.**

Only the counter-plan can solve the aff.

**Anderson and Huggins 3** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

Institutional reform is not free and many countries, for various reasons, resist reform that would improve problems related to human well-being. Perhaps the growing evidence that the protection of private property and growth-enhancing institutions are the building blocks of human well-being will persuade policymakers to reform their established systems (see Norton 2003). **Only by upholding** political and economic institutions that promote and protect **property rights will we** be able to **sustain** development and **environmental quality**. As the Friedmans put it: Our society is what we make it. We can shape our institutions. Physical and human characteristics limit the alternatives available to us. But none prevents us, if we will, from building a society that relies primarily on voluntary cooperation to organize both economic and other activity, a society that preserves and expands human freedom, that keeps government in its place, keeping it our servant and not letting it become our master. (Friedman and Friedman, 1980, 37). **It is critical that we focus our efforts on** developing and protecting the **institutions of freedom rather than** on **regulating** human use of natural **resources through political processes**. The environment is getting better not worse, and it will continue on this course if human ingenuity can continue to hammer out the institutions of freedom, namely **property rights** and the rule of law-institutions that **will provide the incentive for us to solve** whatever **environmental problems** might come our way. As we head into the next millennium, it becomes increasingly clear that the **progress we have enjoyed is primarily attributable to the free**dom of the **market**place and Milton and Rose Friedman have done much to ensure that we have come far on this path. It is important to continue their work by ensuring that the property rights path to sustainable development is made more visible in order to protect the institutions of freedom and the environment at the same time-only then can we have our environmental cake and eat it too!

### AT Counter-Solvency Advocate Theory

I meet. All of the cards in the aff that are pro-REDD would be opposed to the counter-plan.

Counter-Interp – The neg does not have to provide a counter-solvency advocate.

1. He wouldn’t have to research the benefits of the plan or the CP which kills in-depth education. He could just piggy back on my research.

2. Skews aff strat since the neg can influence the 1AR response to the counterplan which will be bad for him because it incentivizes negs to find bad counter-solvency advocates.

3. No ground loss. Do research.

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5. Terry L. Anderson (executive director of the Property and Environment Research Center, a John and Jean de Nault senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and adjunct professor at the Stanford Graduate School of Business) and Laura Huggins (research fellow and director of outreach with PERC as well as a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University). “The Property Rights Path to Sustainable Development.” Property and Environment Research Center. October 23rd, 2003. http://perc.org/articles/property-rights-path-sustainable-development [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
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8. Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, <http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html>) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Clark Gascoigne. “Study Finds Crime, Corruption, Tax Evasion Drained $946.7bn from Developing Countries in 2011.” Global Financial Integrity. December 11th, 2013. http://www.gfintegrity.org/content/view/667/70/ [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Terry L. Anderson (executive director of the Property and Environment Research Center, a John and Jean de Nault senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and adjunct professor at the Stanford Graduate School of Business) and Laura Huggins (research fellow and director of outreach with PERC as well as a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University). “The Property Rights Path to Sustainable Development.” Property and Environment Research Center. October 23rd, 2003. http://perc.org/articles/property-rights-path-sustainable-development [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Jonathan Adler (Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law). “Introduction to Ecology Liberty and Property.” Competitive Enterprise Institute. June 5th, 2000. http://cei.org/op-eds-and-articles/introduction-ecology-liberty-and-property [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Jonathan Adler (Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law). “Introduction to Ecology Liberty and Property.” Competitive Enterprise Institute. June 5th, 2000. http://cei.org/op-eds-and-articles/introduction-ecology-liberty-and-property [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
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